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Abstract
We present a quantum-like (QL) model in that contexts (complexes of
e.g. mental, social, biological, economic or even political conditions) are
represented by complex probability amplitudes. This approach gives the
possibility to apply the mathematical quantum formalism to probabilities
induced in any domain of science. In our model quantum randomness
appears not as irreducible randomness (as it is commonly accepted in
conventional quantum mechanics, e.g., by von Neumann and Dirac), but
as a consequence of obtaining incomplete information about a system.
We pay main attention to the QL description of processing of incomplete
information. Our QL model can be useful in cognitive, social and political
sciences as well as economics and artificial intelligence. In this paper we
consider in a more detail one special application – QL modeling of brain’s
functioning. The brain is modeled as a QL-computer.
Keywords: Incompleteness of quantum mechanics, Quantum-like Represen-
tation of Information, Quantum-like Models in Biology, Psychology, Cognitive
and Social Sciences and Economy, Context, Complex Probabilistic Amplitude
1 Introduction: Quantum Mechanics as Opera-
tion with Incomplete Information
Let us assume that, in spite of a rather common opinion, quantum mechanics
is not a complete theory. Thus the wave function does not provide a complete
description of the state of a physical system. Hence we assume that the view-
point of Einstein, De Broglie, Schro¨dinger, Bohm, Bell, Lamb, Lande, ‘t Hooft
and other believers in the possibility to provide a more detailed description of
quantum phenomena is correct, but the viewpoint of Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli,
Fock, Landau and other believers in the completeness of quantum mechanics
(and impossibility to go beyond it) is wrong. We remark that the discussion on
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completeness/incompleteness of quantum mechanics is also known as the discus-
sion about hidden variables – additional parameters which are not encoded in
the wave function. In this paper we would not like to be involved into this great
discussion, see e.g. [1], [2] for recent debates. We proceed in a very pragmatic
way by taking advantages of the incompleteness viewpoint on quantum mechan-
ics. Thus we would not like to be waiting for until the end of the Einstein-Bohr
debate. This debate may take a few hundred years more.1
What are advantages of the Einstein’s interpretation of the QM-formalism?
The essence of this formalism is not the description of a special class of
physical systems, so called quantum systems, having rather exotic and even
mystical properties, but the possibility to operate with incomplete information
about systems. Thus according to Einstein one may apply the formalism of
quantum mechanics in any situation which can be characterized by incomplete
description of systems. This (mathematical) formalism could be used in any
domain of science, cf. [4]–[7], [8], [9], : in cognitive and social sciences, economy,
information theory. Systems under consideration need not be exotic. However,
the complete description of them should be not available or ignored (by some
reasons).
We repeat again that in this paper it is not claimed that quantum mechanics
is really incomplete as a physical theory. It is not the problem under consid-
eration. We shall be totally satisfied by presenting an information QL model
such that it will be possible to interpret the wave function as an incomplete
description of a system. It might occur that our model could not be applied
to quantum mechanics as a physical theory. However, we shall see that our
model can be used at least outside physics. Therefore we shall speak about a
quantum-like (QL) and not quantum model.
We shall use Einstein’s interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechan-
ics. This is a special mathematical formalism for statistical decision making in
the absence of complete information about systems. By using this formalism
one permanently ignore huge amount of information. However, such an infor-
mation processing does not induce chaos. It is extremely consistent. Thus the
QL information cut off is done in a clever way. This is the main advantage of
the QL processing of information.
We also remark that (may be unfortunately) the mathematical formalism
for operating with probabilistic data represented by complex amplitudes was
originally discovered in a rather special domain of physics, so called quantum
physics. This historical fact is the main barrier on the way of applications
of QL methods in other domains of science, e.g. biology, psychology, sociol-
ogy, economics. If one wants to apply somewhere the mathematical methods
of quantum mechanics (as e.g. Hameroff [10], [11] and Penrose [12], [13] did
in study of brain’s functioning) he would be typically constrained by the con-
ventional interpretation of this formalism, namely, the orthodox Copenhagen
1Even if quantum mechanics is really incomplete it may be that hidden parameters would
be found only on scales of time and space that would be approached not very soon, cf. [3]
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interpretation. By this interpretation quantum mechanics is complete. There
are no additional (hidden or ignored) parameters completing the wave function
description. Quantum randomness is not reducible to classical ensemble ran-
domness, see von Neumann [18], Birkhoff and von Neumann [19].2 It is not easy
to proceed with this interpretation to macroscopic applications.
In this paper we present a contextualist statistical realistic model for QL
representation of incomplete information for any kind of systems: biological,
cognitive, social, political, economical. Then we concentrate our considerations
to cognitive science and psychology [7], [20]. In particular, we shall describe
cognitive experiments to check the QL structure of mental processes.
The crucial role is played by the interference of probabilities for mental ob-
servables. Recently one such experiment based on recognition of images was
performed, see [21], [7]. This experiment confirmed our prediction on the QL
behavior of mind. In our approach “quantumness of mind” has no direct rela-
tion to the fact that the brain (as any physical body) is composed of quantum
particles, cf. [10]–[13]. We invented a new terminology “quantum-like (QL)
mind.”
Cognitive QL-behavior is characterized by a nonzero coefficient of inter-
ference λ (“coefficient of supplementarity”). This coefficient can be found on
the basis of statistical data. There are predicted not only cos θ-interference of
probabilities, but also hyperbolic cosh θ-interference. The latter interference was
never observed for physical systems, but we could not exclude this possibility for
cognitive systems. We propose a model of brain functioning as a QL-computer.
We shall discuss the difference between quantum and QL-computers.
From the very beginning we emphasize that our approach has nothing to
do with quantum reductionism. Of course, we do not claim that our approach
implies that quantum physical reduction of mind is totally impossible. But our
approach could explain the main QL-feature of mind – interference of minds –
without reduction of mental processes to quantum physical processes. Regard-
ing the quantum logic approach we can say that our contextual statistical model
is close mathematically to some models of quantum logic [22], but interpreta-
tions of mathematical formalisms are quite different. The crucial point is that
in our probabilistic model it is possible to combine realism with the main dis-
tinguishing features of quantum probabilistic formalism such as interference of
probabilities, Born’s rule, complex probabilistic amplitudes, Hilbert state space,
and representation of (realistic) observables by operators.
In the first version of this paper I did not present the references on the
original source of firefly in the box example. Andrei Grib told me about this
example, but I had impression that this was a kind of quantum logic folklor.
Recently Bob Coecke and Jaroslaw Pykacz told me the real story of this example.
I am happy to complete my paper with corresponding references.
It was proposed by Foulis who wanted to show that a macroscopic system,
2The founders of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation, Bohr and Heisenberg as well as
e.g. Pauli and Landau, did not discuss so much probabilistic aspects of this interpretation.
This is an astonishing historical fact, since quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic
theory.
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firefly, can exhbit a QL-behavior which can be naturally represented in terms
of quantum logics. First time this example was published in Cohen’s book [14],
a detalied presentation can be found in Foulis’ paper [15], see also Svozil [16].
Later “firefly in the box” was generalized to a so called generalized urn’s model,
by Wright [17] (psychologist).
2 Levels of Organization of Matter and Infor-
mation and their Formal Representations
This issue is devoted to the principles and mechanisms which let matter to build
structures at different levels, and their formal representations. We would like to
extend this issue by considering information as a more general structure than
matter, cf. [23]. Thus material structures are just information structures of a
special type. In our approach it is more natural to speak about principles and
mechanisms which let information to build structures at different levels, and
their formal representations. From this point of view quantum mechanics is
simply a special formalism for operation in a consistent way with incomplete
information about a system. Here a system need not be a material one. It
can be a social or political system, a cognitive system, a system of economic or
financial relations.
The presence of OBSERVER collecting information about systems is always
assumed in our QL model. Such an observer can be of any kind: cognitive
or not, biological or mechanical. The essence of our approach is that such an
observer is able to obtain some information about a system under observation.
As was emphasized, in general this information is not complete. An observer
may collect incomplete information not only because it is really impossible to
obtain complete information. It may occur that it would be convenient for an
observer or a class of observers to ignore a part of information, e.g., about social
or political processes.3
Any system of observers with internal or external structure of self-organization
should operate even with incomplete information in a consistent way. The QL
formalism provides such a possibility.
We speculate that observers might evolutionary develop the ability to op-
erate with incomplete information in the QL way – for example, brains. In
the latter case we should consider even self-observations: each brain performs
measurements on itself. We formulate the hypothesis on the QL structure of
processing of mental information. Consequently, the ability of QL operation
might be developed by social systems and hence in economics and finances.
If we consider Universe as an evolving information system, then we shall
evidently see a possibility that Universe might evolve in such a way that different
levels of its organization are coupled in the QL setting. In particular, in this
model quantum physical reality is simply a level of organization (of information
3We mention that according to Freud’s psychoanalysis human brain can even repress some
ideas, so called hidden forbidden wishes and desires, and send them into the unconsciousness.
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structures, in particular, particles and fields) which is based on a consistent
ignorance of information (signals, interactions) from a prequantum level. In its
turn the latter may also play the role of the quantum level for a pre-prequantum
one and so on. We obtain the model of Universe having many (infinitely many)
levels of organization which are based on QL representations of information
coming from the previous levels.
In same way the brain might have a few levels of transitions from the
classical-like (CL) to the QL description.
At each level of representation of information so called physical, biological,
mental, social or economic laws are obtained only through partial ignorance
of information coming from previous levels. In particular, in our model the
quantum dynamical equation, the Schro¨dinger’s equation, can be obtained as
a special (incomplete) representation of dynamics of classical probabilities, see
section 12.
3 Va¨xjo¨ Model: Probabilistic Model for Results
of Observations
A general statistical realistic model for observables based on the contextual
viewpoint to probability will be presented. It will be shown that classical as
well as quantum probabilistic models can be obtained as particular cases of our
general contextual model, the Va¨xjo¨ model.
This model is not reduced to the conventional, classical and quantum models.
In particular, it contains a new statistical model: a model with hyperbolic cosh-
interference that induces ”hyperbolic quantum mechanics” [7].
A physical, biological, social, mental, genetic, economic, or financial context
C is a complex of corresponding conditions. Contexts are fundamental elements
of any contextual statistical model. Thus construction of any modelM should be
started with fixing the collection of contexts of this model. Denote the collection
of contexts by the symbol C (so the family of contexts C is determined by the
modelM under consideration). In the mathematical formalism C is an abstract
set (of “labels” of contexts).
We remark that in some models it is possible to construct a set-theoretic
representation of contexts – as some family of subsets of a set Ω. For example, Ω
can be the set of all possible parameters (e.g., physical, or mental, or economic)
of the model. However, in general we do not assume the possibility to construct
a set-theoretic representation of contexts.
Another fundamental element of any contextual statistical model M is a set
of observables O : each observable a ∈ O can be measured under each complex
of conditions C ∈ C. For an observable a ∈ O, we denote the set of its possible
values (“spectrum”) by the symbol Xa.
We do not assume that all these observables can be measured simultane-
ously. To simplify considerations, we shall consider only discrete observables
and, moreover, all concrete investigations will be performed for dichotomous
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observables.
Axiom 1: For any observable a ∈ O and its value x ∈ Xa, there are defined
contexts, say Cx, corresponding to x-selections: if we perform a measurement of
the observable a under the complex of physical conditions Cx, then we obtain the
value a = x with probability 1. We assume that the set of contexts C contains
Cx-selection contexts for all observables a ∈ O and x ∈ Xa.
For example, let a be the observable corresponding to some question: a = +
(the answer “yes”) and a = − (the answer “no”). Then the C+-selection context
is the selection of those participants of the experiment who answering “yes” to
this question; in the same way we define the C−-selection context. By Axiom
1 these contexts are well defined. We point out that in principle a participant
of this experiment might not want to reply at all to this question. By Axiom
1 such a possibility is excluded. By the same axiom both C+ and C−-contexts
belong to the system of contexts under consideration.
Axiom 2: There are defined contextual (conditional) probabilities P(a =
x|C) for any context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O .
Thus, for any context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O , there is defined the
probability to observe the fixed value a = x under the complex of conditions C.
Especially important role will be played by probabilities:
pa|b(x|y) ≡ P(a = x|Cy), a, b ∈ O, x ∈ Xa, y ∈ Xb,
where Cy is the [b = y]-selection context. By axiom 2 for any context C ∈ C,
there is defined the set of probabilities:
{P(a = x|C) : a ∈ O}.
We complete this probabilistic data for the context C by contextual probabilities
with respect to the contexts Cy corresponding to the selections [b = y] for all
observables b ∈ O. The corresponding collection of data D(O, C) consists of
contextual probabilities:
P(a = x|C),P(b = y|C),P(a = x|Cy),P(b = y|Cx), ...,
where a, b, ... ∈ O. Finally, we denote the family of probabilistic data D(O, C)
for all contexts C ∈ C by the symbol D(O, C)(≡ ∪C∈CD(O, C)).
Definition 1. (Va¨xjo¨ Model) An observational contextual statistical model
of reality is a triple
M = (C,O,D(O, C)) (1)
where C is a set of contexts and O is a set of observables which satisfy to axioms
1,2, and D(O, C) is probabilistic data about contexts C obtained with the aid of
observables belonging O.
We call observables belonging the set O ≡ O(M) reference of observables.
Inside of a model M observables belonging to the set O give the only possible
references about a context C ∈ C.
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4 Representation of Incomplete Information
Probabilities P(b = y|C) are interpreted as contextual (conditional) probabili-
ties. We emphasize that we consider conditioning not with respect to events as
it is typically done in classical probability [24], but conditioning with respect
to contexts – complexes of (e.g., physical, biological, social, mental, genetic,
economic, or financial) conditions. This is the crucial point.
On the set of all events one can always introduce the structure of the Boolean
algebra (or more general σ-algebra). In particular, for any two events A and B
their set-theoretic intersection A ∩ B is well defined and it determines a new
event: the simultaneous occurrence of the events A and B.
In contract to such an event-conditioning picture, if one have two contexts,
e.g., complexes of physical conditions C1 and C2 and if even it is possible to
create the set-theoretic representation of contexts (as some collections of physi-
cal parameters), then, nevertheless, their set-theoretic intersection C1 ∩C2 (al-
though it is well defined mathematically) need not correspond to any physically
meaningful context. Physical contexts were taken just as examples. The same
is valid for social, mental, economic, genetic and any other type of contexts.
Therefore even if for some model M we can describe contexts in the set-
theoretic framework, there are no reasons to assume that the collection of all
contexts C should form a σ-algebra (Boolean algebra). This is the main differ-
ence from the classical (noncontextual) probability theory [24].
One can consider the same problem from another perspective. Suppose that
we have some set of parameters Ω (e.g., physical, or social, or mental). We also
assume that contexts are represented by some subsets of Ω. We consider two
levels of description. At the first level a lot of information is available. There is
a large set of contexts, we can even assume that they form a σ-algebra of subsets
F . We call them the first level contexts. There is a large number of observables
at the first level, say the set of all possible random variables ξ : Ω → R (here
R is the real line). By introducing on F a probability measure P we obtain the
classical Kolmogorov probability model (Ω,F ,P), see [24]. This is the end of
the classical story about the probabilistic description of reality. Such a model
is used e.g. in classical statistical physics.
We point our that any Kolmogorov probability model induces a Va¨xjo¨ model
in such a way: a) contexts are given by all sets C ∈ F such that P(C) 6= 0; b)
the set of observables coincides with the set of all possible random variables; c)
contextual probabilities are defined as Kolmogorovian conditional probabilities,
i.e., by the Bayes formula: P(a = x|C) = P(ω ∈ C : a(ω) = x)/P(C). This is
the Va¨xjo¨ model for the first level of description.
Consider now the second level of description. Here we can obtain a non-
Kolmogorovian Va¨xjo¨ model. At this level only a part of information about the
first level Kolmogorovian model (Ω,F ,P) can be obtained through a special
family of observables O which correspond to a special subset of the set of all
random variables of the Kolmogorov model (Ω,F ,P) at the first level of descrip-
tion. Roughly speaking not all contexts of the first level, F can be “visible” at
the second level. There is no sufficiently many observables “to see” all contexts
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ω1 ω3
ω2 ω4
Figure 1: The first level (complete) description.
of the first level – elements of the Kolmogorov σ-algebra F . Thus we should
cut off this σ-algebra F and obtain a smaller family, say C, of visible contexts.
Thus some Va¨xjo¨ models (those permitting a set-theoretic representation) can
appear starting with the purely classical Kolmogorov probabilistic framework,
as a consequence of ignorance of information. If not all information is available,
so we cannot use the first level (classical) description, then we, nevertheless, can
proceed with the second level contextual description.
We shall see that starting with some Va¨xjo¨ models we can obtain the quantum-
like calculus of probabilities in the complex Hilbert space. Thus in the opposition
to a rather common opinion, we can derive a quantum-like description for ordi-
nary macroscopic systems as the results of using of an incomplete representation.
This opens great possibilities in application of quantum-like models outside the
micro-world. In particular, in cognitive science we need not consider composing
of the brain from quantum particles to come to the quantum-like model.
Example 1. (Firefly in the box) Let us consider a box which is divided into
four sub-boxes. These small boxes which are denoted by ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 provides
the the first level of description. We consider a Kolmogorov probability space:
Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, the algebra of all finite subsets F of Ω and a probability
measure determined by probabilitiesP(ωj) = pj, where 0 < pj < 1, p1+...+p4 =
1. We remark that in our interpretation it is more natural to consider elements
of Ω as elementary parameters, and not as elementary events (as it was done by
Kolmogorov).
We now consider two different disjoint partitions of the set Ω :
A1 = {ω1, ω2}, A2 = {ω3, ω4},
B1 = {ω1, ω4}, B1 = {ω2, ω3}.
We can obtain such partitions by dividing the box: a) into two equal parts by
the vertical line: the left-hand part gives A1 and the right-hand part A2; b) into
two equal parts by the horizontal line: the top part gives B1 and the bottom
part B2.
We introduce two random variables corresponding to these partitions: ξa(ω) =
xi, if ω ∈ Ai and ξb(ω) = yi ∈ if ω ∈ Bi. Suppose now that we are able to
measure only these two variables, denote the corresponding observables by the
symbols a and b. We project the Kolmogorov model under consideration to a
non-Kolmogorovian Va¨xjo¨ model by using the observables a and b – the second
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A1 A2
b
Figure 2: The second level description: the a-observable.
b
B1
B2
Figure 3: The second level description: the b-observable
level of description. At this level the set of observables O = {a, b} and the nat-
ural set of contexts C : Ω, A1, A2, B1, B2, C1 = {ω1, ω3}, C1 = {ω2, ω4} and all
unions of these sets. Here “natural” has the meaning permitting a quantum-like
representation (see further considerations). Roughly speaking contexts of the
second level of description should be large enough to “be visible” with the aid
of observables a and b.
Intersections of these sets need not belong to the system of contexts (nor
complements of these sets). Thus the Boolean structure of the original first
level description disappeared, but, nevertheless, it is present in the latent form.
Point-sets {ωj} are not “visible” at this level of description. For example, the
random variable
η(ωj) = γj , j = 1, ..., 4, γi 6= γj , i 6= j,
is not an observable at the second level.
Such a model was discussed from positions of quantum logic, see, e.g., [6].
There can be provided a nice interpretation of these two levels of description.
Let us consider a firefly in the box. It can fly everywhere in this box. Its
locations are described by the uniform probability distribution P (on the σ-
algebra of Borel subsets of the box). This is the first level of description. Such
a description can be realized if the box were done from glass or if at every point
of the box there were a light detector. All Kolmogorov random variables can be
considered as observables.
Now we consider the situation when there are only two possibilities to observe
the firefly in the box:
1) to open a small window at a point a which is located in such a way (the
bold dot in the middle of the bottom side of the box) that it is possible to
determine only either the firefly is in the section A1 or in the section A2 of the
box;
2) to open a small window at a point b which is located in such a way (the
bold dot in the middle of the right-hand side of the box) that it is possible to
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determine only either the firefly is in the section B1 or in the section B2 of the
box.
In the first case I can determine in which part, A1 or A2, the firefly is located.
In the second case I also can only determine in which part, B1 or B2, the firefly
is located. But I am not able to look into both windows simultaneously. In such
a situation the observables a and b are the only source of information about
the firefly (reference observables). The Kolmogorov description is meaningless
(although it is incorporated in the model in the latent form). Can one apply
a quantum-like description, namely, represent contexts by complex probability
amplitudes? The answer is to be positive. The set of contexts that permit the
quantum-like representation consists of all subsets C such that P(Ai|C) > 0 and
P(Bi|C) > 0, i = 1, 2 (i.e., for sufficiently large contexts). We have seen that
the Boolean structure disappeared as a consequence of ignorance of information.
Finally, we emphasize again that the Va¨xjo¨ model is essentially more general.
The set-theoretic representation need not exist at all.
5 Quantum Projection of Boolean Logic
Typically the absence of the Boolean structure on the set of quantum propo-
sitions is considered as the violation of laws of classical logic, e.g., in quantum
mechanics [19]. In our approach classical logic is not violated, it is present in the
latent form. However, we are not able to use it, because we do not have com-
plete information. Thus quantum-like logic is a kind of projection of classical
logic. The impossibility of operation with complete information about a system
is not always a disadvantages. Processing of incomplete set of information has
the evident advantage comparing with “classical Boolean” complete informa-
tion processing – the great saving of computing resources and increasing of the
speed of computation. However, the Boolean structure cannot be violated in
an arbitrary way, because in such a case we shall get a chaotic computational
process. There should be developed some calculus of consistent ignorance by
information. Quantum formalism provides one of such calculi.
Of course, there are no reasons to assume that processing of information
through ignoring of its essential part should be rigidly coupled to a special class
of physical systems, so called quantum systems. Therefore we prefer to speak
about quantum-like processing of information that may be performed by various
kinds of physical and biological systems. In our approach quantum computer
has advantages not because it is based on a special class of physical systems
(e.g., electrons or ions), but because there is realized the consistent processing
of incomplete information. We prefer to use the terminology QL-computer by
reserving the “quantum computer” for a special class of QL-computers which
are based on quantum physical systems.
One may speculate that some biological systems could develop in the pro-
cess of evolution the possibility to operate in a consistent way with incomplete
information. Such a QL-processing of information implies evident advantages.
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Hence, it might play an important role in the process of the natural selection.
It might be that consciousness is a form of the QL-presentation of information.
In such a way we really came back to Whitehead’s analogy between quantum
and conscious systems [26].
6 Contextual Interpretation of “Incompatible”
Observables
Nowadays the notion of incompatible (complementary) observables is rigidly
coupled to noncommutativity. In the conventional quantum formalism observ-
ables are incompatible iff they are represented by noncommuting self-adjoint
operators aˆ and bˆ : [aˆ, bˆ] 6= 0. As we see, the Va¨xjo¨ model is not from the very
beginning coupled to a representation of information in a Hilbert space. Our
aim is to generate an analogue (may be not direct) of the notion of incompatible
(complementary) observables starting not from the mathematical formalism of
quantum mechanics, but on the basis of the Va¨xjo¨ model, i.e., directly from
statistical data.
Why do I dislike the conventional identification of incompatibility with non-
commutativity? The main reason is that typically the mathematical formalism
of quantum mechanics is identified with it as a physical theory. Therefore the
quantum incompatibility represented through noncommutativity is rigidly cou-
pled to the micro-world. (The only possibility to transfer quantum behavior to
the macro-world is to consider physical states of the Bose-Einstein condensate
type.) We shall see that some Va¨xjo¨ models can be represented as the con-
ventional quantum model in the complex Hilbert space. However, the Va¨xjo¨
model is essentially more general than the quantum model. In particular, some
Va¨xjo¨ models can be represented not in the complex, but in hyperbolic Hilbert
space (the Hilbert module over the two dimensional Clifford algebra with the
generator j : j2 = +1).
Another point is that the terminology – incompatibility – is misleading in our
approach. The quantum mechanical meaning of compatibility is the possibility
to measure two observables, a and b simultaneously. In such a case they are
represented by commuting operators. Consequently incompatibility implies the
impossibility of simultaneous measurement of a and b. In the Va¨xjo¨ model there
is no such a thing as fundamental impossibility of simultaneous measurement.
We present the viewpoint that quantum incompatibility is just a consequence
of information supplementarity of observables a and b. The information which is
obtained via a measurement of, e.g., b can be non trivially updated by additional
information which is contained in the result of a measurement of a. Roughly
speaking if one knows a value of b, say b = y, this does not imply knowing the
fixed value of a and vice versa, see [20] for details.
We remark that it might be better to use the notion “complementary,” in-
stead of “supplementary.” However, the first one was already reserved by Nils
Bohr for the notion which very close to “incompatibility.” In any event Bohr’s
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complementarity implies mutual exclusivity that was not the point of our con-
siderations.
Supplementary processes take place not only in physical micro-systems. For
example, in the brain there are present supplementary mental processes. There-
fore the brain is a (macroscopic) QL-system. Similar supplementary processes
take place in economy and in particular at financial market. There one could
also use quantum-like descriptions [8]. But the essence of the quantum-like de-
scriptions is not the representation of information in the complex Hilbert space,
but incomplete (projection-type) representations of information. It seems that
the Va¨xjo¨ model provides a rather general description of such representations.
We introduce a notion of supplementary which will produce in some cases
the quantum-like representation of observables by noncommuting operators, but
which is not identical to incompatibility (in the sense of impossibility of simul-
taneous observations) nor complementarity (in the sense of mutual exclusivity).
Definition 2. Let a, b ∈ O. The observable a is said to be supplementary to
the observable b if
pa|b(x|y) 6= 0, (2)
for all x ∈ Xa, y ∈ Xb.
Let a = x1, x2 and b = y1, y2 be two dichotomous observables. In this case
(2) is equivalent to the condition:
pa|b(x|y) 6= 1, (3)
for all x ∈ Xa, y ∈ Xb. Thus by knowing the result b = y of the b-observation we
are not able to make the definite prediction about the result of the a-observation.
Suppose now that (3) is violated (i.e., a is not supplementary to b), for
example:
pa|b(x1|y1) = 1, (4)
and, hence, pa|b(x2|y1) = 0. Here the result b = y1 determines the result a = x1.
In future we shall consider a special class of Va¨xjo¨ models in that the ma-
trix of transition probabilities Pa|b = (pa|b(xi|yj))2i,j=1 is double stochastic:
pa|b(x1|y1) + pa|b(x1|y2) = 1; pa|b(x2|y1) + pa|b(x2|y2) = 1. In such a case the
condition (4) implies that
pa|b(x2|y2) = 1, (5)
and, hence, pa|b(x1|y2) = 0. Thus also the result b = y2 determines the result
a = x2.
We point out that for models with double stochastic matrix
Pa|b = (pa|b(xi|yj))2i,j=1
the relation of supplementary is symmetric! In general it is not the case. It can
happen that a is supplementary to b : each a-measurement gives us additional
information updating information obtained in a preceding measurement of b (for
any result b = y). But b can be non-supplementary to a.
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Let us now come back to Example 1. The observables a and b are sup-
plementary in our meaning. Consider now the classical Kolmogorov model
and suppose that we are able to measure not only the random variables ξa
and ξb – observables a and b, but also the random variable η. We denote the
corresponding observable by d. The pairs of observables (d, a) and (d, b) are
non-supplementary:
pa|d(x1|γi) = 0, i = 3, 4; pa|d(x2|γi) = 0, i = 1, 2,
and, hence,
pa|d(x1|γi) = 1, i = 1, 2; pa|d(x2|γi) = 1, i = 3, 4.
Thus if one knows , e.g., that d = γ1 then it is definitely that a = x1 and so on.
7 A Statistical Test to Find Quantum-like Struc-
ture
We consider examples of cognitive contexts:
1). C can be some selection procedure that is used to select a special group
SC of people or animals. Such a context is represented by this group SC (so this
is an ensemble of cognitive systems). For example, we select a group Sprof.math.
of professors of mathematics (and then ask questions a or (and) b or give corre-
sponding tasks). We can select a group of people of some age. We can select a
group of people having a “special mental state”: for example, people in love or
hungry people (and then ask questions or give tasks).
2). C can be a learning procedure that is used to create some special group of
people or animals. For example, rats can be trained to react to special stimulus.
We can also consider social contexts. For example, social classes: proletariat-
context, bourgeois-context; or war-context, revolution-context, context of eco-
nomic depression, poverty-context, and so on. Thus our model can be used in
social and political sciences (and even in history). We can try to find quantum-
like statistical data in these sciences.
We describe a mental interference experiment.
Let a = x1, x2 and b = y1, y2 be two dichotomous mental observables:
x1=yes, x2=no, y1=yes, y2=no. We set X ≡ Xa = {x1, x2}, Y ≡ Xb = {y1, y2}
(“spectra” of observables a and b). Observables can be two different questions
or two different types of cognitive tasks. We use these two fixed reference ob-
servables for probabilistic representation of cognitive contextual reality given by
C.
We perform observations of a under the complex of cognitive conditions C :
pa(x) =
the number of results a = x
the total number of observations
.
So pa(x) is the probability to get the result x for observation of the a under the
complex of cognitive conditions C. In the same way we find probabilities pb(y)
for the b-observation under the same cognitive context C.
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As was supposed in axiom 1, cognitive contexts Cy can be created corre-
sponding to selections with respect to fixed values of the b-observable. The
context Cy (for fixed y ∈ Y ) can be characterized in the following way. By
measuring the b-observable under the cognitive context Cy we shall obtain the
answer b = y with probability one. We perform now the a-measurements under
cognitive contexts Cy for y = y1, y2, and find the probabilities:
pa|b(x|y) = number of the result a = x for context Cy
number of all observations for context Cy
where x ∈ X, y ∈ Y. For example, by using the ensemble approach to probability
we have that the probability pa|b(x1|y2) is obtained as the frequency of the
answer a = x1 = yes in the ensemble of cognitive system that have already
answered b = y2 = no. Thus we first select a sub-ensemble of cognitive systems
who replies no to the b-question, Cb=no. Then we ask systems belonging to
Cb=no the a-question.
It is assumed (and this is a very natural assumption) that a cognitive system
is “responsible for her (his) answers.” Suppose that a system τ has answered
b = y2 = no. If we ask τ again the same question b we shall get the same answer
b = y2 = no. This is nothing else than the mental form of the von Neumann
projection postulate: the second measurement of the same observable, performed
immediately after the first one, will yield the same value of the observable).
Classical probability theory tells us that all these probabilities have to be
connected by the so called formula of total probability:
pa(x) = pb(y1)p
a|b(x|y1) + pb(y2)pa|b(x|y2), x ∈ X.
However, if the theory is quantum-like, then we should obtain [7] the formula
of total probability with an interference term:
pa(x) = pb(y1)p
a|b(x|y1) + pb(y2)pa|b(x|y2) (6)
+2λ(a = x|b, C)
√
pb(y1)pa|b(x|y1)pb(y2)pa|b(x|y2),
where the coefficient of supplementarity (the coefficient of interference) is given
by
λ(a = x|b, C) = p
a(x) − pb(y1)pa|b(x|y1)− pb(y2)pa|b(x|y2)
2
√
pb(y1)pa|b(x|y1)pb(y2)pa|b(x|y2)
(7)
This formula holds true for supplementary observables. To prove its validity, it
is sufficient to put the expression for λ(a = x|b, C), see (7), into (6). In the
quantum-like statistical test for a cognitive context C we calculate
λ¯(a = x|b, C) = p¯
a(x)− p¯b(y1)p¯a|b(x|y1)− p¯b(y2)p¯a|b(x|y2)
2
√
p¯b(y1)p¯a|b(x|y1)p¯b(y2)p¯a|b(x|y2)
,
where the symbol p¯ is used for empirical probabilities – frequencies. An em-
pirical situation with λ(a = x|b, C) 6= 0 would yield evidence for quantum-like
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behaviour of cognitive systems. In this case, starting with (experimentally cal-
culated) coefficient of interference λ(a = x|b, C) we can proceed either to the
conventional Hilbert space formalism (if this coefficient is bounded by 1) or to
so called hyperbolic Hilbert space formalism (if this coefficient is larger than
1). In the first case the coefficient of interference can be represented in the
trigonometric form λ(a = x|b, C) = cos θ(x), Here θ(x) ≡ θ(a = x|b, C) is the
phase of the a-interference between cognitive contexts C and Cy, y ∈ Y. In this
case we have the conventional formula of total probability with the interference
term:
pa(x) = pb(y1)p
a|b(x|y1) + pb(y2)pa|b(x|y2) (8)
+2 cos θ(x)
√
pb(y1)pa|b(x|y1)pb(y2)pa|b(x|y2).
In principle, it could be derived in the conventional Hilbert space formalism.
But we chosen the inverse way. Starting with (8) we could introduce a “mental
wave function” ψ ≡ ψC (or pure quantum-like mental state) belonging to this
Hilbert space. We recall that in our approach a mental wave function ψ is just a
representation of a cognitive context C by a complex probability amplitude. The
latter provides a Hilbert representation of statistical data about context which
can be obtained with the help of two fixed observables (reference observables).
8 The Wave Function Representation of Con-
texts
In this section we shall present an algorithm for representation of a context
(in fact, probabilistic data on this context) by a complex probability amplitude.
This QL representation algorithm (QLRA) was created by the author [7]. It can
be interpreted as a consistent projection of classical probabilistic description (the
complete one) onto QL probabilistic description (the incomplete one).
Let C be a context. We consider only contexts with trigonometric interfer-
ence for supplementary observables a and b – the reference observables for coming
QL representation of contexts. The collection of all trigonometric contexts, i.e.,
contexts having the coefficients of supplementarity (with respect to two fixed
observables a and b) bounded by one, is denoted by the symbol C tr ≡ C tr
a|b. We
again point out to the dependence of the notion of a trigonometric context on
the choice of reference observables.
We now point directly to dependence of probabilities on contexts by using
the context lower index C. The interference formula of total probability (6) can
be written in the following form:
paC(x) =
∑
y∈Xb
pbC(y)p
a|b(x|y) + 2 cos θC(x)
√
Πy∈Y pbC(y)p
a|b(x|y) (9)
By using the elementary formula:
D = A+B + 2
√
AB cos θ = |
√
A+ eiθ
√
B|2,
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for A,B > 0, θ ∈ [0, 2pi], we can represent the probability paC(x) as the square
of the complex amplitude (Born’s rule):
paC(x) = |ϕC(x)|2, (10)
where a complex probability amplitude is defined by
ϕ(x) ≡ ϕC(x) =
√
pbC(y1)p
a|b(x|y1) + eiθC(x)
√
pbC(y2)p
a|b(x|y2) . (11)
We denote the space of functions: ϕ : Xa → C, where C is the field of
complex numbers, by the symbol Φ = Φ(Xa,C). Since Xa = {x1, x2}, the Φ is
the two dimensional complex linear space. By using the representation (11) we
construct the map
Ja|b : C tr → Φ(X,C)
which maps contexts (complexes of, e.g., physical or social conditions) into
complex amplitudes. This map realizes QLRA.
The representation (10) of probability is nothing other than the famous
Born rule. The complex amplitude ϕC(x) can be called a wave function
of the complex of physical conditions (context) C or a (pure) state. We set
eax(·) = δ(x− ·). The Born’s rule for complex amplitudes (10) can be rewritten
in the following form:
paC(x) = |(ϕC , eax)|2, (12)
where the scalar product in the space Φ(X,C) is defined by the standard for-
mula:
(ϕ, ψ) =
∑
x∈Xa
ϕ(x)ψ¯(x). (13)
The system of functions {eax}x∈Xa is an orthonormal basis in the Hilbert space
H = (Φ, (·, ·)).
Let Xa be a subset of the real line. By using the Hilbert space representation
of the Born’s rule we obtain the Hilbert space representation of the expectation
of the reference observable a:
E(a|C) =
∑
x∈Xa
x|ϕC(x)|2 =
∑
x∈Xa
x(ϕC , e
a
x)(ϕC , e
a
x) = (aˆϕC , ϕC),
where the (self-adjoint) operator aˆ : H → H is determined by its eigenvectors:
aˆeax = xe
a
x, x ∈ Xa. This is the multiplication operator in the space of complex
functions Φ(X,C) :
aˆϕ(x) = xϕ(x).
It is natural to represent this reference observable (in the Hilbert space model)
by the operator aˆ.
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We would like to have Born’s rule not only for the a-observable, but also for
the b-observable.
pbC(y) = |(ϕ, eby)|2 , y ∈ Xb.
Thus both reference observables would be represented by self-adjoint operators
determined by bases {eax}, {eby}, respectively.
How can we define the basis {eby} corresponding to the b-observable? Such
a basis can be found starting with interference of probabilities. We set ubj =√
pbC(yj), pij = p
a|b(xj |yi), uij = √pij , θj = θC(xj). We have:
ϕ = ub1e
b
1 + u
b
2e
b
2, (14)
where
eb1 = (u11, u12), e
b
2 = (e
iθ1u21, e
iθ2u22) (15)
We consider the matrix of transition probabilities Pa|b = (pij). It is always a
stochastic matrix: pi1 + pi2 = 1, i = 1, 2). We remind that a matrix is called
double stochastic if it is stochastic and, moreover, p1j + p2j = 1, j = 1, 2. The
system {ebi} is an orthonormal basis iff the matrix Pa|b is double stochastic
and probabilistic phases satisfy the constraint: θ2 − θ1 = pi mod 2pi, see [7] for
details.
It will be always supposed that the matrix of transition probabilities Pa|b is
double stochastic. In this case the b-observable is represented by the operator
bˆ which is diagonal (with eigenvalues yi) in the basis {ebi}. The Kolmogorovian
conditional average of the random variable b coincides with the quantum Hilbert
space average:
E(b|C) =
∑
y∈Xb
ypbC(y) = (bˆφC , φC), C ∈ C tr.
9 Brain as a System Performing a Quantum-like
Processing of Information
The brain is a huge information system that contains millions of elementary
mental states . It could not “recognize” (or “feel”) all those states at each
instant of time t. Our fundamental hypothesis is that the brain is able to create
the QL-representations of mind. At each instant of time t the brain creates the
QL-representation of its mental context C based on two supplementary mental
(self-)observables a and b. Here a = (a1, ..., an) and b = (b1, ..., bn) can be very
long vectors of compatible (non-supplementary) dichotomous observables. The
reference observables a and b can be chosen (by the brain) in different ways at
different instances of time. Such a change of the reference observables is known
in cognitive sciences as a change of representation.
A mental context C in the a|b− representation is described by the mental
wave function ψC . We can speculate that the brain has the ability to feel this
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mental field as a distribution on the space X. This distribution is given by the
norm-squared of the mental wave function: |ψC(x)|2.
In such a model it might be supposed that the state of our consciousness
is represented by the mental wave function ψC . The crucial point is that in
this model consciousness is created through neglecting an essential volume of
information contained in subconsciousness. Of course, this is not just a random
loss of information. Information is selected through QLRA, see (11): a mental
context C is projected onto the complex probability amplitude ψC .
The (classical) mental state of sub-consciousness evolves with time C →
C(t). This dynamics induces dynamics of the mental wave function ψ(t) = ψC(t)
in the complex Hilbert space.
Further development of our approach (which we are not able to present here)
induces the following model of brain’s functioning [9]:
The brain is able to create the QL-representation of mental contexts, C → ψC
(by using the algorithm based on the formula of total probability with interfer-
ence).
10 Brain as Quantum-like Computer
The ability of the brain to create the QL-representation of mental contexts
induces functioning of the brain as a quantum-like computer.
The brain performs computation-thinking by using algorithms of quantum
computing in the complex Hilbert space of mental QL-states.
We emphasize that in our approach the brain is not quantum computer,
but a QL-computer. On one hand, a QL-computer works totally in accordance
with the mathematical theory of quantum computations (so by using quantum
algorithms). On the other hand, it is not based on superposition of individual
mental states. The complex amplitude ψC representing a mental context C is
a special probabilistic representation of information states of the huge neuronal
ensemble. In particular, the brain is a macroscopic QL-computer. Thus the QL-
parallelism (in the opposite to conventional quantum parallelism) has a natural
realistic base. This is real parallelism in the working of millions of neurons.
The crucial point is the way in which this classical parallelism is projected onto
dynamics of QL-states. The QL-brain is able to solve NP -problems. But there
is nothing mysterious in this ability: an exponentially increasing number of
operations is performed through involving of an exponentially increasing number
of neurons.
We point out that by coupling QL-parallelism to working of neurons we
started to present a particular ontic model for QL-computations. We shall
discuss it in more detail. Observables a and b are self-observations of the brain.
They can be represented as functions of the internal state of brain ω. Here ω
is a parameter of huge dimension describing states of all neurons in the brain:
ω = (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN ) :
a = a(ω), b = b(ω).
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The brain is not interested in concrete values of the reference observables at
fixed instances of time. The brain finds the contextual probability distributions
paC(x) and p
b
C(y) and creates the mental QL-state ψC(x), see QLRA – (11).
Then it works with the mental wave function ψC(x) by using algorithms of
quantum computing.
11 Two Time Scales as the Basis of the QL-
representation of Information
The crucial problem is to find a mechanism for producing contextual probabili-
ties. We think that they are frequency probabilities that are created in the brain
in the following way.There are two scales of time: a) internal scale, τ -time; b)
QL-scale, t-time. The internal scale is finer than the QL-scale. Each instant of
QL-time t corresponds to an interval ∆ of internal time τ. We might identify
the QL-time with mental (psychological) time and the internal time with phys-
ical time. We shall also use the terminology: pre-cognitive time-scale - τ and
cognitive time-scale - t.
During the interval ∆ of internal time the brain collects statistical data for
self-observations of a and b. The internal state ω of the brain evolves as
ω = ω(τ, ω0).
This is a classical dynamics (which can be described by a stochastic differential
equation).
At each instance of internal time τ there are performed nondisturbative
self-measurements of a and b. These are realistic measurements: the brain gets
values a(ω(τ, ω0)), b(ω(τ, ω0)). By finding frequencies of realization of fixed val-
ues for a(ω(τ, ω0)) and b(ω(τ, ω0)) during the interval ∆ of internal time, the
brain obtains the frequency probabilities paC(x) and p
b
C(y). These probabilities
are related to the instant of QL-time time t corresponding to the interval of in-
ternal time ∆ : paC(t, x) and p
b
C(t, y). We remark that in these probabilities the
brain encodes huge amount of information – millions of mental “micro-events”
which happen during the interval ∆. But the brain is not interested in all those
individual events. (It would be too disturbing and too irrational to take into
account all those fluctuations of mind.) It takes into account only the integral
result of such a pre-cognitive activity (which was performed at the pre-cognitive
time scale).
For example, the mental observables a and b can be measurements over dif-
ferent domains of brain. It is supposed that the brain can “feel” probabilities
(frequencies) paC(x) and p
b
C(y), but not able to “feel” the simultaneous proba-
bility distribution pC(x, y) = P (a = x, b = y|C).
This is not the problem of mathematical existence of such a distribution.
This is the problem of integration of statistics of observations from different do-
mains of the brain. By using the QL-representation based only on probabilities
paC(x) and p
b
C(y) the brain could be able to escape integration of information
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about individual self-observations of variables a and b related to spatially sepa-
rated domains of brain. The brain need not couple these domains at each instant
of internal (pre-cognitive time) time τ. It couples them only once in the interval
∆ through the contextual probabilities paC(x) and p
b
C(y). This induces the huge
saving of time and increasing of speed of processing of mental information.
One of fundamental consequences for cognitive science is that our mental
images have the probabilistic structure. They are products of transition from
an extremely fine pre-cognitive time scale to a rather rough cognitive time scale.
Finally, we remark that a similar time scaling approach was developed in [3]
for ordinary quantum mechanics. In [3] quantum expectations appear as results
of averaging with respect to a prequantum time scale. There was presented an
extended discussion of possible choices of quantum and prequantum time scales.
We can discuss the same problem in the cognitive framework. We may try to
estimate the time scale parameter ∆ of the neural QL-coding. There are strong
experimental evidences, see, e.g., [25], that a moment in psychological time
correlates with ≈ 100 ms of physical time for neural activity. In such a model
the basic assumption is that the physical time required for the transmission of
information over synapses is somehow neglected in the psychological time. The
time (≈ 100 ms) required for the transmission of information from retina to the
inferiotemporal cortex (IT) through the primary visual cortex (V1) is mapped
to a moment of psychological time. It might be that by using
∆ ≈ 100ms
we shall get the right scale of the QL-coding.
However, it seems that the situation is essentially more complicated. There
are experimental evidences that the temporial structure of neural functioning
is not homogeneous. The time required for completion of color information in
V4 (≈ 60 ms) is shorter that the time for the completion of shape analysis in
IT (≈ 100 ms). In particular it is predicted that there will be under certain
conditions a rivalry between color and form perception. This rivalry in time is
one of manifestations of complex level temporial structure of brain. There may
exist various pairs of scales inducing the QL-representations of information.
12 The Hilbert Space Projection of Contextual
Probabilistic Dynamics
Let us assume that the reference observables a and b evolve with time: x =
x(t), y = y(t), where x(t0) = a and y(t0) = b. To simplify considerations,
we consider evolutions which do not change ranges of values of the reference
observables: Xa = {x1, x2} and Xb = {y1, y2} do not depend on time. Thus,
for any t, x(t) ∈ Xa and y = y(t) ∈ Xb.
In particular, we can consider the very special case when the dynamical ref-
erence observables correspond to classical stochastic processes: x(t, ω)), y(t, ω)),
where x(t0, ω) = a(ω) and y(t0, ω) = b(ω). Under the previous assumption these
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are random walks with two-points state spaces Xa and Xb. However, we recall
that in general we do not assume the existence of Kolmogorov measure-theoretic
representation.
Since our main aim is the contextual probabilistic realistic reconstruction of
QM, we should restrict our considerations to evolutions with the trigonometric
interference. We proceed under the following assumption:
(CTRB) (Conservation of trigonometric behavior) The set of trigonometric
contexts does not depend on time: C tr
x(t)|y(t) = C
tr
x(t0)|y(t0)
= C tr
a|b.
By (CTRB) if a context C ∈ C tr
x(t0)|y(t0)
, i.e., at the initial instant of time
the coefficients of statistical disturbance |λ(x(t0) = x|y(t0), C)| ≤ 1, then the
coefficients λ(x(t) = x|y(t), C) will always fluctuate in the segment [0, 1]. 4
For each instant of time t, we can use QLRA, see (11): a context C can be
represented by a complex probability amplitude:
ϕ(t, x) ≡ ϕx(t)|y(t)C (x) =
√
p
y(t)
C (y1)p
x(t)|y(t)(x|y1)
+eiθ
x(t)|y(t)
C
(x)
√
p
y(t)
C (y2)p
x(t)|y(t)(x|y2).
We remark that the observable y(t) is represented by the self-adjoint operator
yˆ(t) defined by its with eigenvectors:
eb1t =
( √
pt(x1|y1)√
pt(x2|y1)
)
eb2t = e
iθC(t)
( √
pt(x1|y2)
−
√
pt(x2|y1)
)
where pt(x|y) = px(t)|y(t)(x|y), θC(t) = θx(t)|y(t)C (x1) and where we set ebjt ≡
e
y(t)
j . We recall that θ
x(t)|y(t)
C (x2) = θ
x(t)|y(t)
C (x1) + pi, since the matrix of tran-
sition probabilities is assumed to be double stochastic for all instances of time.
We shall describe dynamics of the wave function ϕ(t, x) starting with follow-
ing assumptions (CP) and (CTP). Then these assumptions will be completed by
the set (a)-(b) of mathematical assumptions which will imply the conventional
Schro¨dinger evolution.
(CP)(Conservation of b-probabilities) The probability distribution of the b-
observable is preserved in process of evolution: p
y(t)
C (y) = p
b(t0)
C (y), y ∈ Xb, for
any context C ∈ C tr
a(t0)|b(t0)
. This statistical conservation of the b-quantity will
have very important dynamical consequences. We also assume that the law of
conservation of transition probabilities holds:
(CTP) (Conservation of transition probabilities) Probabilities pt(x|y) are
conserved in the process of evolution: pt(x|y) = pt0(x|y) ≡ p(x|y).
Under the latter assumption we have:
eb1t ≡ eb1t0 , eb2t = ei[θC(t)−θC(t0)]eb2t0 .
For such an evolution of the y(t)-basis bˆ(t) = bˆ(t0) = bˆ. Hence the whole stochas-
tic process y(t, ω) is represented by one fixed self-adjoint operator bˆ. This is a
good illustration of incomplete QL representation of information.
4Of course, there can be considered more general dynamics in which the trigonometric
probabilistic behaviour can be transformed into the hyperbolic one and vice versa.
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Thus under assumptions (CTRB), (CP) and (CTP) we have:
ϕ(t) = ub1e
b
1t + u
b
2e
b
2t = u
b
1e
b
1t0 + e
iξC(t,t0)ub2e
b
2t0 ,
where ubj =
√
p
b(t0)
C (yj), j = 1, 2, and ξC(t, t0) = θC(t)− θC(t0). Let us consider
the unitary operator Uˆ(t, t0) : H → H defined by this transformation of basis:
ebt0 → ebt . In the basis ebt0 = {eb1t0 , eb2t0} the Uˆ(t, t0) can be represented by the
matrix:
Uˆ(t, t0) =
(
1 0
0 eiξC(t,t0)
)
.
We obtained the following dynamics in the Hilbert space H:
ϕ(t) = Uˆ(t, t0)ϕ(t0). (16)
This dynamics looks very similar to the Schro¨dinger dynamics in the Hilbert
space. However, the dynamics (16) is essentially more general than Schro¨dinger’s
dynamics. In fact, the unitary operator Uˆ(t, t0) = Uˆ(t, t0, C) depends on the
context C, i.e., on the initial state ϕ(t0) : Uˆ(t, t0) ≡ Uˆ(t, t0, ϕ(t0)). So, in fact,
we derived the following dynamical equation: ϕ(t) = Uˆ(t, t0, ϕ0)ϕ0, where, for
any ϕ0, Uˆ(t, t0, ϕ0) is a family of unitary operators.
The conditions (CTRB), (CP) and (CTP) are natural from the physical
viewpoint (if the b-observable is considered as an analog of energy, see further
considerations). But these conditions do not imply that the Hilbert space image
of the contextual realistic dynamics is a linear unitary dynamics. In general the
Hilbert space projection of the realistic prequantum dynamics is nonlinear. To
obtain a linear dynamics, we should make the following assumption:
(CI) (Context independence of the increment of the probabilistic phase) The
ξC(t, t0) = θC(t)− θC(t0) does not depend on C.
Under this assumption the unitary operator Uˆ(t, t0) = diag(1, e
iξ(t,t0)) does
not depend on C. Thus the equation (16) is the equation of the linear unitary
evolution. The linear unitary evolution (16) is still essentially more general than
the conventional Schro¨dinger dynamics. To obtain the Schro¨dinger evolution,
we need a few standard mathematical assumptions:
(a). Dynamics is continuous: the map (t, t0)→ Uˆ(t, t0) is continuous5; (b).
Dynamics is deterministic; (c). Dynamics is invariant with respect to time-
shifts; Uˆ(t, t0) depends only on t− t0 : Uˆ(t, t0) ≡ Uˆ(t− t0).
The assumption of determinism can be described by the following relation:
φ(t; t0, φ0) = φ(t; t1, φ(t1; t0, φ0)), t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t, where φ(t; t0, φ0) = Uˆ(t, t0)φ0.
It is well known that under the assumptions (a), (b), (c) the family of (linear)
unitary operators Uˆ(t, t0) corresponds to the one parametric group of unitary
operators: Uˆ(t) = e−
i
h
Hˆt, where Hˆ : H → H is a self-adjoint operator. Here
h > 0 is a scaling factor (e.g., the Planck constant). We have: Hˆ = diag(0,E),
where
E = −h
[θC(t)− θC(t0)
t− t0
]
.
5We recall that there is considered the finite dimensional case. Thus there is no problem
of the choice of topology.
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Hence the Schro¨dinger evolution in the complex Hilbert space corresponds to the
contextual probabilistic dynamics with the linear evolution of the probabilistic
phase:
θC(t) = θC(t0)− E
h
(t− t0).
We, finally, study the very special case when the dynamical reference ob-
servables correspond to classical stochastic processes: x(t, ω)), y(t, ω)). This is
a special case of the Va¨xjo¨ model: there exist the Kolmogorov representation
of contexts and the reference observables. Let us considxer a stochastic process
(rescaling of the process y(t, ω)) : H(t, ω) = 0 if y(t, ω) = y1 and H(t, ω) = E
if y(t, ω) = y2. Since the probability distributions of the processes y(t, ω)) and
H(t, ω) coincide, we have p
H(t)
C (0) = p
H(t0)
C (0); p
H(t)
C (E) = p
H(t0)
C (E).
If E > 0 we can interpret H(t, ω) as the energy observable and the operator
Hˆ as its Hilbert space image. We emphasize that the whole “energy process”
H(t, ω) is represented by a single self-adjoint nonnegative operator Hˆ in the
Hilbert space. This is again a good illustration of incomplete QL represen-
tation of information. This operator, “quantum Hamiltonian”, is the Hilbert
space projection of the energy process which is defined on the “prespace” Ω.
In principle, random variables H(t1, ω), H(t2, ω), t1 6= t2, can be very different
(as functions of ω). We have only the law of statistical conservation of energy:
p
H(t)
C (z) ≡ pH(t0)C (z), z = 0, E.
13 Concluding Remarks
We created an algorithm – QLRA – for representation of a context (in fact,
probabilitic data on this context) by a complex probability amplitude.
QLRA can be applied consciously by e.g. scientists to provide a consistent
theory which is based on incomplete statistical data. By our interpretation
quantum physics works in this way. However, we can guess that a complex
system could perform such a self-organization that QLRA would work auto-
matically creating in this system the two levels of organization: CL-level and
QL-level. Our hypothesis is that the brain is one of such systems with QLRA-
functioning. We emphasize that in the brain QLRA-representation is performed
on the unconscious level (by using Freud’s terminology: in the unconsciousness).
But the final result of application of QLRA is presented in the conscious do-
main in the form of feelings, associations and ideas, cf. [27] and [28]. We guess
that some complex social systems are able to work in the QLRA-regime. As
well as for the brain for such a social system, the main advantage of working
in the QLRA-regime is neglecting by huge amount of information (which is not
considered as important). Since QLRA is based on choosing a fixed class of
observables (for a brain or a social system they are self-observables), impor-
tance of information is determined by those observables. The same brain or
social system can use parallely a number of different QL representations based
on applications of QLRA for different reference observables.
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We can even speculate that physical systems can be (self-) organized through
application of QLRA. As was already pointed out, Universe might be the greates
user of QLRA.
Conclusion. The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics can be
applied outside of physics, e.g., in cognitive, social, and political sciences, psy-
chology, economics and finances.
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